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ABSTRACT 
Beatriz Rey: Autocracy vs. Democracy:  
Political Regimes and Punctuated Equilibrium in Brazil 
(Under the direction of Frank R. Baumgartner) 
 
I test the punctuated equilibrium theory (PET) developed by Jones and Baumgartner (2005) 
in the context of authoritarianism and democracy in Latin America. By analyzing public 
budgeting in Brazil, I find evidence that supports the PET. In both political regimes, there is a 
combination of policy stability and policy punctuations, implying that the distinction between 
authoritarianism and democracy is not fundamental for understanding budget allocation in 
Latin America.  I find that the level of proportionality in governmental response in 
authoritarian regimes is greater than in democracies and that proportionality is substantially 
lower in democracies when centrist ideology and severe economic constraints lead 
policymakers to develop a narrower set of goals. Once severe economic constraints decrease 
and a left-wing political party assumes power, the level of proportionality increases. 
Nevertheless, I find that the level of proportionality can be at best medium because of 
policymakers’ limited attention to all issues. 
  
	  iv	  
	  
ACKNOLEDGMENTS 
 
I am thankful for the support that I received from the faculty at UNC during the last two 
years. The guidance of Frank R. Baumgartner since the very first week of my Master’s 
program was extremely important for my development as a graduate student. Graeme 
Robertson’s class on Democratization provided me with a strong theoretical background that 
made me increasingly curious about the topic of this thesis. Finally, Evelyne Huber’s classes 
encouraged me to think more and more about theoretical questions in the context of Latin 
America. 
I am also grateful for the friendships that I made in this department. Kiran Auerbach, 
Bilyana Petrova, Gabriele Magni, Zoila Ponce de Leon, and Federico Fuchs: thank you for 
the countless days of laughs and tears.  
I thank the Rotary Foundation for offering me a fellowship that allowed me to study 
in this department. 
I am in eternal debt with my parents, Carlos and Cristina, whose hard work took me 
here. They taught me that there is nothing more important in life than studying and doing 
things right. To my dearest husband, Theo, without whom none of this would be possible: 
thank you for your endless support, love, and care. Being in this journey with you is what 
makes everything possible. 
	  v	  
	  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES …………………………………………………………………………. vii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES ……………………………………………………………………..… viii 
 
Introduction……………………………………………….….………………………………. 9  
 
 
Theoretical Perspectives and Hypotheses………………….….…………………….….……11 
 
 
Methods………………….….…………………….….…………………….….……………..32 
 
 
Public Spending: Autocracy vs. Democracy………………….….…………………….….…37 
 
 
Proportionality and the PTE: Autocracy vs. Democracy………………….….……………...42 
 
 
Conclusion and future research ..............………………………………………………....60 
 
 
REFERENCES………………….….…………………….….…………………….….……...63
	  vi	  
	  
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1 – Components of the variable “multiplicity of goals” ……………………………... 16 
 
Table 2 – Measurement of proportionality …………………………………………….….... 35 
 
Table 3 – Measurement of the variable “signal detection” ……………………………….... 37 
 
Table 4 – Multiplicity of goals of authoritarian and democratic governments………..……..54 
 
 
 
  
	  vii	  
	  
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1 – Summary of the theoretical model ………………………………….….…….......18 
 
Figure 2 – Total Spending in all policy areas – Authoritarianism and Democracy….............39 
 
Figure 3 – Total Spending in all policy areas – Authoritarianism  (1964-1985)…………….39 
 
Figure 4 – Total Spending in Education and Culture and Health  ………………...…….......40 
 
Figure 5 – Budget change frequency distribution – Authoritarianism (1965-1985)…………44 
 
 
Figure 6 – Budget change frequency distribution – Democracy (1995-2010) ……………....45  
 
Figure 7 – Budget change frequency distribution – Authoritarianism 1 (1964-1974)……….46 
 
Figure 8 – Budget change frequency distribution – Authoritarianism 2 (1975-1985)……….46 
 
Figure 9 – Budget change frequency distribution – Cardoso (1995-2002) ………………….47 
 
Figure 10 – Budget change frequency distribution – Lula (2003-2010) …………………….47 
 
 
Figure 11 – Political Rights Score and L-Kurtosis ………………………….….……...........48  
 
Figure 12 – Civil Liberties Score and L-Kurtosis  ……………………………………..........49 
 
Figure 13 – Percent Change in Education and Culture, Health, and Social Affairs ......…….57 
 
Figure 14 – Percent Change in Industry, Energy, and Public Works ……………..................57 
 
 
	  viii	  
	  
Figure 15 – Percent Change in Agriculture, Labor, and Justice ……......................................58 
 
 
Figure 16 – Percent Change in Communications, Defense, and Finance...……….................58 
 
 
	  9	  
	  
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Scholars from different methodological traditions have produced a wide range of theories 
about what prompts democratization in the last thirty years (e.g. Rueschemeyer, Stephens, 
and Stephens 1992; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 
2006).  While studies of regime change allowed us to learn a great deal about the mechanisms 
that sustain authoritarianism or lead countries to democratize, our knowledge about the ways 
in which governing takes place in various political regimes is still limited. To put it 
differently, the puzzle of how policymaking is affected by the key features of political 
regimes still merits the attention of political scientists.  
In this paper, I make a contribution to policymaking scholarship by testing the 
punctuated equilibrium theory developed by Jones and Baumgartner (2005) in the contexts of 
authoritarianism and democracy in Latin America. To my knowledge, this is the first test of 
the theory in both circumstances. The punctuated equilibrium theory states that 
disproportionality in governmental response to the vast array of societal problems creates 
patterns of extended periods of policy stability marked by sudden shifts of policy change. The 
authors argue that disproportionate information processing is caused by institutional friction 
(the existence of veto points that can provoke political deadlock) and cognitive limitations 
(triggered by bounded rationality).  
My work indicates that the distinction between authoritarianism and democracy is not 
fundamental for understanding budget allocation in Latin America. Rather, what is important 
is the interaction between the extent to which governments adopt multiple goals, the level of 
the threshold that triggers government action, and cognitive limitations that causes 
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proportionality or disproportionality in governmental response. Also the extent to which there 
is signal detection, economic constraints, and the level of monopoly of government by 
autocrats (in authoritarian regimes) or different partisan ideologies (in democracies) impact 
the formation of governmental goals. 
By analyzing public budgeting in Brazil (1964-1985, 1995-2010), I find evidence that 
supports the punctuated equilibrium theory, that is, in both political regimes there is a 
combination of policy stability and policy punctuations. I also find that the level of 
proportionality in governmental response in authoritarian regimes is greater than in 
democracies. The analysis of different periods of government within each political regime 
makes clear that proportionality is substantially lower in democracies when centrist ideology 
and severe economic constraints lead policymakers to develop narrower sets of goals. Once 
severe economic constraints are gone and there is a presence of leftist ideology, the level of 
proportionality increases. 
However, I find that the level of proportionality can be at best medium because of 
policymakers’ limited attention to all issues. In other words, I find medium levels of 
proportionality under different circumstances in authoritarian regimes and democracies that 
encourage a strong connection between the size of changes in governmental response to the 
size of changes in the incoming signals from the environment. 
Finally, my work points to the importance of policymaking scholarship focused on 
Latin America to look beyond the adoption of social policies in order to develop a better 
understanding of the impact of party platforms on policy choices. By briefly analyzing the 
case of energy policy, I indicate that not all policy changes can be attributed to partisan 
ideology. The second section explores previous works on policymaking in both regimes, and 
lays out my theoretical framework. The third section presents the methodological approach. 
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The fourth section highlights the importance of democracies to social spending. The fifth 
section presents evidence about proportionality in governmental response and analyzes the 
case of energy policy. The last section concludes and indicates issues that require future 
research.   
 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND HYPOTHESES 
 This paper is mainly concerned with the development of a theory of policy change in 
authoritarian and democratic regimes. The body of work that explores the internal dynamics 
of decision-making and governing in authoritarian regimes is not vast, and it is generally 
focused on research questions related to the mechanisms that explain regime durability 
(Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Malesky and Shuler 2010; Falleti 2011) or on specific policy 
issues (Brown 2002; Kinne 2005; Taylor 2013). In other words, not much is known about the 
patterns of decision-making in such political regimes or the extent to which autocrats use 
their power to maintain status quo policies or to promote policy changes.   
The field of policy studies in democracies, on the other hand, offers various 
frameworks that prioritize information, institutions, preferences, or power distributions 
among holders of different preferences to explain policymaking and policy change. Among 
the authors that highlight the role of institutions is Tsebelis (1995, 2002), who argues that 
policymaking is defined by the number of institutional, partisan, or other veto players1. In 
general, Tsebelis argues that a high number of veto players is associated with a low 
probability of policy change. Similarly, Immergut (1992) maintains that the institutional 
designs of different decision-making processes account for divergent policy outcomes.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Veto players are defined by Tsebelis as “individual or collective actors whose agreement (by majority rule for 
collective actors) is required for a change in the status quo (Tsebelis 1995, 302). In a review of the author’s 
work, Merkel defines partisan veto players as those actors whose consent to a political decision is required by 
the constitution or by law. Partisan veto players are all parties that belong to the governing coalition. Merel 
highlights that Tsebelis also speaks of “other” veto players in several articles: courts, central banks, the military, 
powerful interest groups, etc. (Merkel 2003).   
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Other scholars have explored the role political parties and electoral outcomes have as 
the central source of policy change in democracies (e.g. Hibbs 1975, 1977, 1992; Alesina and 
Rosenthal 1995; Klingemann, Hofferbert, & Budge 1994; Cusak 1995; Hicks 1999; Huber 
and Stephens 1993, 2001, 2012). The party theory as described by Hibbs (1992) states that 
because parties are moved by their electoral ambitions, they implement policies that favor 
their core constituencies. But party platforms explain the rise of issues to the policy agenda 
only to a certain extent, since incumbents and their platforms cannot predict the problems that 
will rise to the agenda over the term of an electoral mandate nor the strategies of the 
opposition, which may highlight problems that were not government priorities (Baumgartner, 
Jones, and Wilkerson 2011, 954).  
The acknowledgment that policymaking cannot be fully explained by partisanship led 
scholars to investigate the role of information and information processing in decision-making 
and policy outcomes. Developed mostly in the American politics subfield, the study of 
policymaking through public budgeting has evolved substantially in the last decades. 
Theories of incrementalism (Lindblom 1959; Wildavsky 1964), which propose that decision-
makers make incremental corrections from the status quo, have been questioned by several 
scholars since the 1970s2. The main criticism of incrementalism is its inability to explain 
abrupt policy changes. If policymaking comes down to policy stability, how is it possible to 
account for policy instability? This question recently led political scientists to develop 
alternative accounts for the overall pattern of policy behavior. Jones and Baumgartner’s 
(2005) disproportionate information-processing framework argues that the same mechanism 
– the interaction between cognitive and institutional friction – explains both stability and 
punctuations in public policy. These patterns generate what the authors call the punctuated 
equilibrium model of public policy, a model this paper explores in great depth.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See Jones and Baumgartner (2005) for a broad review of these critiques. 
	  13	  
	  
Approaches that prioritize institutions, preferences, and ideas have also been used by 
scholars who explore policymaking in Latin America. Studies of public policy have focused 
on specific policy issues and oscillated between the complete adoption or the absolute 
rejection of theories and concepts developed in the context of advanced industrial countries 
(Díez and Franceschet 2012). Among the body of works that emphasize institutions is the 
work developed by a group of scholars (Stein et al. 2005; Stein and Tommasi 2008; Stein et 
al. 2010; Alston et al. 2006) whose rational choice institutionalist approach takes 
policymaking as the result of political actors’ exchanges and bargains in different arenas. 
Drawing on the power constellation theory, Huber and Stephens (2012) maintain that 
democracy, through the rise of left parties, has a strong direct influence on education and 
health spending in Latin American countries. The literature on the role of ideas in the region 
is not extensive. Weyland’s (2007) work on policy diffusion in the Latin American social 
sector is one of the few that emphasizes the role of ideas and bounded rationality in 
policymaking, while more recent research (Patroni and Felder 2012; Lacombe 2012) explore 
the themes of framing and agenda-setting. Works that prioritize information processing in the 
region are, however, still rare in the field.  
In sum, although it is true that one finds a plethora of works on policymaking in 
democracies, especially in advanced industrial countries, the literature on policymaking in 
authoritarian regimes began to develop only recently. In the absence of extensive works on 
the latter, it is not completely clear how policy formation processes vary in different political 
regimes. Furthermore, the literature about policymaking in Latin America is still emerging. 
This set of theoretical gaps is particularly problematic since authoritarianism was the 
predominant model in the region during most of the 20th century. Knowledge about both 
policymaking in authoritarianism and policymaking in developing countries is still limited. 
This makes our understanding about governing in that part of the globe very restricted, in 
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particular in terms of what policy processes accumulate across regimes. Therefore, this paper 
hopes to make a threefold theoretical contribution to the literature in that it expands our 
knowledge about (1) policymaking in authoritarian regimes, (2) the differences between 
policymaking in authoritarian and democratic regimes and (3) policy formation processes in 
developing countries.  
 
Theoretical framework 
In this paper, government is not understood primarily as the representative of 
dominant economic interests, the mediator of conflicts between individual or among groups, 
or a simple tool in the hands of political leaders that wish to retain power (Ames 1987). I 
adopt a definition of government that highlights its problem-solving nature: governments are 
systems that detect problems and discuss and adopt solutions to address those problems 
(Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Adler and Wilkerson 2012). The fact that I adopt such 
framework does not imply that my work is insulated from other approaches to government. 
The focus on problem-solving allows me to investigate how the different characteristics of 
political regimes affect the detection of problems, the allocation of resources, and the policy 
priorities of decision-makers. I believe the assessment of these three dimensions can bring 
about implications for other bodies of work that are not directly associated with the definition 
of government adopted in this paper.    
The larger goal of this thesis is to understand how political regimes affect 
policymaking. I do so by testing the punctuated equilibrium model (hereafter PET) of public 
policy proposed by Jones and Baumgartner (2005) in authoritarian regimes and democracies 
in the context of Latin America. My focus in this paper is public budgeting. I maintain that 
the PET holds in both cases but that the mechanisms that underpin it are distinct. The 
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interaction between what I call the “multiplicity of goals,” the level of threshold that triggers 
government action, and cognitive overload determines the patterns of stability and change. In 
contrast to what the original PET predicts, institutional friction (or the existence of veto 
points that can lead to possible political deadlock in policymaking) is always low in some 
authoritarian regimes and democracies in Latin America. 
An example of the lack of an institutional friction constraint in Latin America is that 
autocrats do not need to be concerned with institutional checks and balances. Given the 
structure of even the democratic regimes in some countries of the region, certain executives 
also retain extensive powers and hold strong authority over budgeting. Democracies and 
authoritarian regimes differ substantially, however, with regard to the extent to which 
governments are exposed to civil society and political leaders are responsive to the mass 
population. Openness to civil society and electoral accountability, two fundamental problem-
detection and problem-prioritization devices, enhance signal detection, that is, the capacity of 
governments to absorb information from the external environment. In authoritarian regimes, 
low levels of signal detection push governments to develop narrow sets of goals. In 
democracies, low to medium levels of signal detection push governments to develop multiple 
sets of goals.  
I argue, however, that two other groups of factors affect the extent to which 
governments establish multiple goals. In both political regimes, economic constraints shape 
goal definition through (1) the existence of economic crises or (2) the dependence of Latin 
American countries in relation to multinational corporations or financial markets. The second 
variable differs according to the political regime. In authoritarian regimes, the variable in 
question is authoritarian monopoly, that is, the extent to which autocrats and their ruling 
coalition are united and exert control over government. In democracies, the variable in 
question is partisan ideology, which can lead governments to prioritize sets of problems at the 
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expense of not considering others. Table 1 summarizes the definition of the variable 
“multiplicity of goals:” it is comprised of the form of government (authoritarian or 
democratic) and two groups of factors (economic constraints, authoritarian monopoly, in the 
case of authoritarianism, and partisan ideology, in the case of democracies). It is the 
interaction between signal detection and the factors that affect the definition of goals that 
determine the level of multiplicity. For instance, variation in authoritarian monopoly and 
economic constraints under authoritarianism can provoke changes in signal detection. 
Similarly, variation in partisan ideology and economic constraints in democracies can 
provoke changes in signal detection.   
 
Table 1 – Components of the variable “multiplicity of goals” 
Signal detection Factors that affect the 
definition of goals 
Level of 
multiplicity 
Very low to low • Economic 
constraints 
• Authoritarian 
monopoly 
Low to medium 
Low to medium • Economic 
constraints 
• Partisan 
ideology 
Medium to High 
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Openness to civil society and electoral accountability also affect what Jones and 
Baumgartner (2005) call the level of threshold that triggers government action. I argue that 
the more isolated the government is from social problems, the higher the level of threshold, 
that is, the less burdensome it is for policymakers to ignore the severity of problems. 
Conversely, the more embodied the government is within social problems, the lower the level 
of threshold, that is, the more burdensome it is for policymakers to ignore the severity of 
problems. Finally, in this paper, the variable “cognitive overload” refers to two types of 
cognitive limitations: policymakers may be unable to address social problems because of 
constraints of attention allocation, or policymakers may be unwilling to address social 
problems because of the presence of political crises, economic crises, or ideological 
preferences. 
In my framework, the variable multiplicity of goals interacts with both the level of 
threshold and cognitive overload to generate different levels of disproportionate information 
processing in both political regimes. In other words, the sizes of the changes in governmental 
response are not proportionate to the sizes of the changes in the incoming signals from the 
environment. I argue that unaddressed problems accumulate within and across regimes and 
eventually force themselves into the boundaries of government, which provokes the patterns 
of stability and punctuations predicted by Jones and Baumgartner (2005). Figure 1 presents 
the full theoretical model. The first step to develop a better understanding of these 
mechanisms is to conduct more research on the topic, an issue I address in the last section of 
this thesis.  
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Figure 1 – Summary of the theoretical model 
 
 
Jones and Baumgartner’s (2005) framework aims to explain how governments detect, 
prioritize, and respond to information. It is based on a model of cognition that predicts 
bounded rationality for decision-makers – that is, it states that decision-makers face problems 
related to attention scarcity and issue interpretation, and struggle to choose among competing 
solutions to the same problem. Besides being incapable of focusing on and addressing a 
particular social problem, policymakers can also be unwilling to do so since (1) some 
important social problems simply have no apparent solutions, (2) the explicit calculation that 
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the problem is not worth the effort given other competing claims, and (3) they can be guided 
by ideology. These cognitive limitations operate together with institutional arrangements 
(“institutional friction”) to generate disproportionate information-processing. Political 
institutions can prevent policy change (Tsebelis 1995, 2002; Immergut 1992) because they 
generate costs that keep the course of public policy steady and unvarying in the face of lots of 
change (Jones and Baumgartner 2005). The result is a disproportionality in governmental 
response, that is, the government cannot respond in a proportionate manner to the intensity of 
the signals from the broader political environment (Jones and Baumgartner 2005, 276).  
The authors use a stochastic approach to explore patterns of proportionality and 
disproportionality in governmental response in the United States. They measure the policy 
processes through several indicators, the most relevant for this thesis being budgets, and 
make a frequency distribution of annual percent changes in spending from year to year.  If 
information were proportionately processed (that is, if all policy changes were keyed to 
changes in the external environment), one would expect to find a normal distribution of 
budget change. This happens because the Central Limit Theorem guarantees that multiple 
independent random variables (in this case, individual social inputs) will be normally 
distributed in the aggregate.  
That is not the case since democratic governments are faced with an overabundance 
of information about different policy issues. Because decision-makers are boundedly rational 
and the processing capacity of political organizations (such as Congress or cabinets) is 
constrained by institutional rules, one finds disproportionality in governmental response in 
democracies. Initially, this results in an extreme allegiance to the status quo for long periods 
of time since policymakers ignore signals from the environment and the public. But they 
cannot ignore such signals indefinitely; societal problems eventually need to be addressed 
societal problems, either because policymakers must represent their constituents or because 
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policymakers must take information from the media or social groups into consideration. They 
do so by overreacting. As a result, one finds a pattern of long periods of policy stability 
marked by abrupt policy changes, or what the authors call a punctuated equilibrium model of 
public policy. Jones and Baumgartner study several distributions of policy change 
(congressional hearings, laws, executive orders, budget outlays and so on) and find that all of 
them present the shape of a leptokurtic distribution. In other words, all of them have a 
combination of fat tails and a slender central peak (Jones and Baumgartner 2005; 111), which 
characterize extreme stability and occasional punctuations. 
The first question of interest for this paper is: What happens to policymaking when 
the type of political regime is altered? What patterns can we expect in terms of governmental 
efficiency and policy behavior in bureaucratic authoritarian regimes? Developing an 
understanding about the nature of governing in such regimes is a first step to make 
predictions in this sense. A good starting point is the model proposed by Cohen, March, and 
Olsen (1972) of “organized anarchies,” which was adapted to Kingdon (1984) to explain the 
operation of government in democracies. Organized anarchies are characterized by 
problematic preferences, unclear technology, and fluid participation. That is, in organizations 
with fluid boundaries that allow different people to drift in and out of decision-making, there 
are numerous and inconsistent goals and a lack of clarity about how to address these goals. 
As Kingdon notes, this description suits the functioning of democratic governments very 
well. It is difficult to identify one single goal for democratic governments because they are 
continuously responsive to the preferences of citizens through electoral representation (Dahl 
1971) or through freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, which allow different 
actors to mobilize distinct interests (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). In democracies, therefore, 
there should be high multiplicity of goals, that is, government should have diverse and 
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conflicting purposes because it responds to interests that are equally disparate and 
antagonistic.  
Authoritarian governments, and in particular contested autocracies3 (Svolik 2012), are 
not organized anarchies. To start, boundaries are not fluid, since decision-making is in the 
hands of a few groups. Svolik (2012) uses the term “ruling coalition” to refer to the set of 
individuals who support a dictator and, jointly with him, hold enough power to guarantee the 
regime’s survival. In authoritarian settings, governing is in the hands of dictators and their 
ruling coalition. There is another reason why boundaries are not fluid: authoritarian 
governments do not allow different people to drift in and out of decision-making because the 
majority of the population is excluded from governmental affairs. Though mechanisms 
guarantee the exclusion of the masses, dictators are not elected (so there is no responsiveness 
to the preferences) and freedom of expression and freedom of assembly are severely 
constrained (so there is no political participation).   In this scenario, the only people that 
mobilize interests are those who are a part of the ruling coalition.  
Svolik (2012) introduces the idea that the key features of authoritarianism 
(institutions, policies, and even the survival of leaders and regimes) are shaped by the 
problems of power-sharing and authoritarian control. The first refers to the challenges in 
power-sharing between dictators and their ruling coalition. The second describes the 
confrontations between dictators and the majority excluded from power.  I use Svolik’s 
typology to define the variable “authoritarian monopoly,” which refers to the extent to which 
dictators and their ruling coalition remain united and maintain control of the state. As long as 
authoritarian monopoly exists, I argue that governmental goals should be not numerous and 
should be less conflicting.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 In contested autocracies the dictator’s allies can credibly threaten him with removal. In established autocracies, 
on the other hand, the dictator has effectively monopolized power (Svolik 2012: 197).  
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Narrow goals result in clear technology, that is, the means to accomplish authoritarian 
goals should be known to participants in government. Take, for instance, the goal of 
controlling subversive movements, which is common in autocracies. The technology to 
achieve this is clear: the regime must develop repressive apparatuses. In theory, as long as the 
dictator and his ruling coalition are united and control governing, there should be low 
multiplicity of goals, that is, government should have similar and consonant goals, because it 
responds to the interests that are equally conforming and agreeable. If the dictator and his 
ruling coalition lose control of the authoritarian government, the level of multiplicity of goals 
can vary from low to medium, since government should have to respond to interests that can 
be diverse and conflicting4.  
Yet in the case of the bureaucratic authoritarian regimes (O’Donnell 1973) that 
developed in South America in the 1960s and 1970s, another factor must be taken into 
account in the process of definition of governmental goals. At the core of the concept of 
bureaucratic authoritarianism is the capitalist-dependent position of Latin American countries 
within the global economy, which constrains policymaking in the region (also in 
democracies, as I argue below), especially in periods of economic crises. Latin American 
states are mostly weak, lacking autonomy to act independently from the pressures of 
international actors and foreign investors. The problems associated with import-substitution 
industrialization resulted in economic crises in the 1960s and 1970s, which engendered an 
alliance between the domestic elites (military and civilian technocrats) and foreign capital. 
This association favored orthodox economic policies that would promote the long-term 
economic stability desired by multinational corporations (Collier 1979). Some countries, 
however, adopted gradualist versions of orthodox economic policies (Ames 1987; Baer 
2014), and Brazil was one of them.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 This description does not apply to all types of authoritarianism. I discuss this issue in the last section of the 
thesis.  
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The military coups that instituted those regimes were themselves the products of an 
alliance between military and civilian technocrats. The control of the state was in the hands of 
non-elected military rulers, and decision-making was largely a responsibility of technocrats. 
These technocrats were public officials who had attended business schools molded after 
prestigious U.S. institutions; military officers who had studied abroad and in military 
academies and who had adopted the curricula and approaches proposed by foreign advisory 
missions; and técnicos who received their degrees outside of South America (O’Donnell 
1973; 78). O’Donnell notes that the training technocrats acquired stressed a “technical 
problem-solving approach” of “rational decision-makers:” emotional issues were discarded, 
the ambiguity of bargaining and politics were considered hindrances to rational solutions, and 
conflict was by definition considered to be dysfunctional. Technocrats also prioritized 
efficiency in decision-making, and considered that efficient outcomes were the ones that 
could be measured. Thus, one goal of bureaucratic authoritarian governments was rationality.  
Rationality was perceived as a prerequisite in the accomplishment of a second priority 
of those regimes: long-term economic stability. Regardless of the level of adoption of 
orthodox economic policies, technocratic policymakers were only concerned with the 
enactment of policies that promoted industrialization; there was no preoccupation with the 
needs of the masses. In fact, the adopted policies hurt the popular sectors, since they led to 
cuts in social spending and elimination of social benefits, greater inequality and the 
elimination of inefficient producers from the economy. Not surprisingly, technocrats 
measured governmental performance using a limited set of indicators that evaluated only the 
level of industrialization and capital accumulation (GNP growth, growth in the efficient 
sectors of the economy, low rate of inflation, low level of social unrest, and favorable 
external balance-of-payments and movements of international capital). They neglected 
indicators such as poverty or troublesome developments in income distribution.  
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O’Donnell’s argument is that the alliance between the coercive apparatus of the 
bureaucratic authoritarian state and the technocrats resulted in stable policy options. 
Governments that successfully blocked popular resistance to the aforementioned policies with 
coercion received support from/became more dependent on technocrats, for whom “the only 
policy options are more of the same” (O’Donnell 1973; 103). In order to guarantee that 
popular resistance would be blocked, the solution was to close all channels of political access 
to policymaking by means of repression, through the abolition of political parties, or the 
imposition of vertical control by the state on organizations such as labor unions. In fact, such 
exclusion was seen as a step in the process of macroeconomic stabilization. Political 
democracy and wealth redistribution could occur only after the regime achieved political 
hegemony and capital accumulation in the more “dynamic” sectors (O’Donnell 1973; 88).  
The question of how long can a government ignore the severity of social problems is 
critical to my framework. In their theory, Jones and Baumgartner assume that the measures of 
severity that are indexed to problems (in other words, information) carry thresholds that 
trigger governmental action (Jones and Baumgartner 2005: 51). In other words, governmental 
attentions shift when information about a problem accumulates to a point that makes the 
problem too severe to be disregarded or when the contents of certain pieces of information 
are too severe to be ignored. If a government is purposefully paying attention to some 
problems, but not to all social problems, its attention only shifts in relation to the monitored 
problems. The work of O’Donnell (1973) indicates that bureaucratic-authoritarian 
policymakers were insulated from social problems because (1) the important goal was the 
stabilization of the economy (any indicator beyond the ones mentioned above were 
considered “noise”) and (2) the popular sectors were not only excluded but repressed. The 
threshold that triggers governmental action was, therefore, high, which means that 
policymakers could bear the costs of not addressing social problems.  
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I hypothesize that in bureaucratic authoritarian regimes in which there is strong 
authoritarian monopoly, economic crises of low to medium severity, and very low signal 
detection, policymakers are able to pursue the narrow set of goals that initially motivated the 
coup. I further theorize that the level of proportionality of government to problems in this 
case is medium, since policymakers are constrained by cognitive limitations, and the level of 
threshold is high, which allows them to ignore several problems.   
In terms of budgeting during the first period of the bureaucratic authoritarian regime, 
technocrats attempt to act rationally and efficiently in order to contain the economic crises 
and satisfy multinational corporations by making small budgetary adjustments in the policy 
areas monitored by them, namely, those that promote industrialization and capital 
accumulation. However, policymakers can only be bounded rationally. I argue that attention 
limitation leads technocrats to ignore different issues, even in the context of low multiplicity 
of goals. Accordingly, technocrats eventually make a number of substantial budgetary 
adjustments because they are not able to pay full attention to the problems that suit their 
narrow set of goals. Thus I expect to find evidence that supports the PET in such periods in 
the form of a leptokurtic distribution of budget changes with a medium value of kurtosis. This 
indicates medium proportionality, that is, that the level of association between policy changes 
and changes in the environment monitored by technocrats was medium.   
 
H1: In the first period of bureaucratic authoritarianism, low multiplicity of goals, high 
threshold, and cognitive overload produce a leptokurtic distribution of budget changes with a 
medium value of kurtosis (medium proportionality).  
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The use of repression as the means to control the mass population creates a by-
product problem of power sharing to dictators: the repressive apparatus gain muscle to resist 
political control (Svolik 2012: 159).  In this context, the level of authoritarian monopoly 
weakens. The fact that several problems are unaddressed because policymakers are blinded 
from the real external signals and are insulated from social issues creates more problems of 
authoritarian control. As problems become more numerous and more severe, and the right to 
participate is constantly denied to the population, the external environment becomes unstable. 
In the presence of economic crises of high severity, such instability is heightened. 
Under the circumstances of weak authoritarian monopoly and economic crises of high 
severity, dictators envision the possibility of regime collapse. They opt to marginally increase 
signal detection to low and to adopt goals whose level of multiplicity varies from low to 
medium. Although political participation and electoral accountability are still absent in this 
stage, policymakers are more attentive to social problems because they need to promote 
policy innovations that legitimize the regime with the excluded population and the ruling 
coalition. In the case of bureaucratic authoritarianism, the reason why dictators need to 
legitimize the regime is that they want to avoid any sort of government dismantlement not 
initiated by them and which can hurt the military as an institution. Stepan (1988) points out 
four interests of the military in maintaining the regime, despite their intent of promoting 
liberalization: in order to protect themselves, they preferred to have a pro-government 
civilian who would maintain the regime; they feared the declining prestige in the public’s 
eyes and future retaliation; and they wanted to maintain a strong and personnel presence in all 
state enterprises associated with national security (Stepan 1988; 57-59).  
I hypothesize that, in collapsing bureaucratic authoritarian regimes, the existence of a 
political crisis that is generated mainly by the weak level of authoritarian monopoly locks-in 
decision-making and leads policymakers to put more weight on the need to present results to 
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the population and the ruling coalition than on other goals. I further theorize that decision-
makers promote several policy innovations despite the signals that point to the existence of 
economic crises of high severity. Such signals can be ignored because the level of threshold 
is not low in this stage; it is medium5.  
In terms of budgeting during the second period of bureaucratic authoritarianism, 
policymakers promote more minor investments than cuts, despite the economic constraints, 
and they also enact more substantial policy changes than policy cuts. I argue that they are 
unwilling to pay attention to all problems (including the ones generated by economic crises) 
because they are mostly concerned with promoting policy innovations that allow them to 
present results to the population and the ruling coalition. Thus I expect to find evidence that 
supports the PET in such period in the form a leptokurtic distribution of budget changes with 
a high value of kurtosis. This indicates low proportionality, that is, that level of association 
between policy changes and changes in the environment monitored by policymakers was low. 
Furthermore, I expect the budget frequency distribution to be skewed to the right, which 
indicates that policy innovations were more frequent than policy cuts.  
 
H2: In the second period of bureaucratic authoritarian regimes, low to medium multiplicity 
of goals, medium threshold, and cognitive overload produce a leptokurtic distribution of 
budget changes with a high value of the kurtosis (low proportionality). The budget frequency 
distribution in this case is skewed to the right.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Both Ames (1987) and Baer (2014) emphasize that Brazil did not fully adopt orthodox policies to foster 
economic stabilization and growth, especially in the second period analyzed in this paper (1975-1985). While 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) pressured policymakers for the adoption of orthodox economic policies, 
Brazil could resist to such pressures because of the size of the Brazilian economy, which gave leverage to 
policymakers in relation to the IMF pressure (Huber and Stephens 2012: 157) 
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As opposed to advanced industrial democracies, institutional friction is not a 
constraint in budgeting in Latin American democracies because presidents are central in 
policy processes. Díez (2012) refers to the presidencialist systems in the region as 
“hyperpresidentialism.” The author notes that in some circumstances there is an undue 
concentration of power in the hands of presidents, whose authority derives from an array of 
sources, such as personal relations and informal accepted practices, and who possess large 
discretion in the exercise of administrative and regulatory powers. As I argue in the next 
sections, this is the case in Brazil, where the president relies on formal institutions to control 
policymaking processes, including budgeting. In any case, it would be necessary to collect 
other sources of data – House and Senate hearings, House and Senate bills, media analysis 
and so forth – in order to investigate the extent to which there is institutional friction in 
policymaking processes that go beyond public budgeting.  
As discussed above, the work of Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972) and Kingdon 
(1984) leads us to the conclusion that democratic governments have multiple goals. In this 
paper I argue that different factors can impact the level of multiplicity of goals of democratic 
countries. First, the capitalist dependent position of Latin American countries within the 
global economy and the existence of economic crises limit the formation of multiple goals in 
democratic governments. The economic crises of the mid-1980s and the late 1990s led 
countries to adhere to neoliberal reforms and to promote the policy reforms endorsed by 
international organizations. These reforms strengthened the need to spur growth, since trade 
liberalization opened up Latin America’s economies to foreign competition (Weyland 2004). 
Foreign direct investment could only be attracted if national economies were stable. This 
conditionality often led policymakers in the region to implement severe budget cuts that 
improved macroeconomic stability. But economic constraints only tell us a part of the story. 
The literature about the effect of the ideological orientations of policymakers on policy 
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choice is extensive (see for instance Hibbs 1977 and Boix 2000). To sum up, while leftist 
governments adopt policies that smooth the business cycle by stimulating aggregate demand 
and favor larger government, right governments avoid inflation, run balanced budgets, and 
favor smaller government (Ha and Kang forthcoming). Given the role of presidents in 
budgeting in Latin American countries, their ideological orientations are of great importance 
to this paper.  
My argument is that both the Cardoso (1995-2002) and the Lula (2003-2010) 
administrations face pressures to maintain macroeconomic stability and growth, but the 
association of severe economic crises with a centrist ideological orientation leads the Cardoso 
administration to develop a narrower set of governmental goals of medium level of 
multiplicity. In the context of the highly severe economic crises of the 1990s, policymakers 
opt to comply with the policy reforms endorsed by international organizations, which leads 
them to place more weight on economic goals – austerity and the need to establish balanced 
budgets – than on others. Being in a democratic government and embodied in social 
problems, decision-makers need to pay attention to the demands put forth by the masses as 
the level of threshold that triggers government action in democracies is low. For instance, the 
Cardoso administration expanded social expenditures, particularly in education. However, the 
weight placed on economic goals impairs the ability of policymakers to substantially increase 
spending in the issues that fit their goals or to address other issues in general.  
In terms of budgeting during the first period of democracy, policymakers engage in 
frequent incremental cuts in expenses, but also in a number of policy changes. I argue that 
they are unwilling to pay attention to all problems because of the need to address economic 
crises of high-severity locks-in decision-making. In the case of the Cardoso administration, I 
expect to find evidence that supports the PET in the form of a leptokurtic distribution of 
budget changes with a very high value of the kurtosis. This indicates very low 
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proportionality, that is, the level of association between policy changes and changes in the 
environment were extremely low. 
 
H3: In the first period of democracy, medium multiplicity of goals, low level of threshold, and 
cognitive overload produce a leptokurtic distribution of budget changes with a very high 
value of the kurtosis (very low proportionality). 
 
 In the case of the second period of democracy analyzed in this paper, I maintain that a 
combination of (1) no economic crises, (2) economic dependence on financial markets and 
(3) a leftist ideological orientation leads the Lula administration to develop a set of multiple 
governmental goals, which involves economic stability and growth, redistribution, poverty 
alleviation, investment in health and education, and so forth. In the context of high 
multiplicity of goals, policymakers’ ability to take signals that come through the environment 
is not impaired. But since they are still constrained by the attention limitation, they cannot 
absorb all external signals. This results in disproportionate information processing. In terms 
of budgeting during the second period of democracy, I expect to find frequent incremental 
increases in expenses and also a small number of policy changes. Finally, in the case of the 
Lula administration, I expect to find evidence that supports the PET in the form of a 
leptokurtic distribution of budget changes with a medium value of the kurtosis. This indicates 
medium proportionality, that is, the level of association between policy changes and changes 
in the environment was medium. 
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H4: In the second period of democracy, high multiplicity of goals, low threshold, and 
cognitive overload produce a leptokurtic distribution of budget changes with a medium value 
of the kurtosis (medium proportionality). 
 
The argument I make in this thesis is, therefore, twofold. First, narrower sets of goals 
developed in the second period of bureaucratic authoritarianism and the first period of 
democracy lead policymakers to be reluctant to address societal problems. Under 
authoritarianism, weak levels of authoritarian monopoly push for the development of 
narrower sets of goals in authoritarianism, locking-in decision-making to promote policy 
innovations that do not necessarily address the signals of economic crises. In the case of 
democracies, the combination of the economic crises of high severity that push policymakers 
to adopt the policy prescriptions of international financial institutions as well as the centrist 
ideology cause the development of “blinders” in policymaking – even in Brazil, a country 
whose size of the economy creates leverage in terms of avoiding ISI prescriptions.  
Furthermore, this thesis also makes the contention that, notwithstanding the political 
regime, proportionality in governmental response can best be medium because of limited 
attention. As I argue below, I find evidence of medium proportionality in the case of the first 
period of bureaucratic authoritarianism and the second period of democracy. The underlying 
mechanisms that result in such level of proportionality are undoubtedly different, but they 
yield the same outcome: even working under conditions that should encourage 
proportionality, policymakers are unable to address all societal problems.  
In the first period of authoritarianism, decision-makers had rationality as a key goal, 
monitored only a set of problems, were blinded from signal detection through electoral 
accountability and political participation, and dealt with a high level of thresholds that 
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allowed them to not address problems. In the second period of democracy, decision-makers 
favored larger government and had no constraints to monitoring as many problems as 
possible. There were no economic crises, electoral accountability and political participation 
functioned at a minimum satisfactory, and decision-makers dealt with a low level of 
thresholds that forced them to address problems. In both cases, governmental proportionality 
in addressing problems reaches the level of medium. It is true that social spending increases 
in democracy, and in particular during the second period, but poverty, education, and health 
are hardly the only problems that demand solution in democratic governments. The next 
section delves into the methodological approach of this paper.  
  
METHODS 
The aim of this thesis is to understand how political regimes affect policymaking. I do 
so by testing the punctuation equilibrium theory with public budgeting data in authoritarian 
and democratic Brazil (1964-1985, 1995-2010). I consider Brazil an ideal testing ground for 
my research question because it allows me to test the PET not only in the context of 
authoritarianism, but also in the context of Latin America. To my knowledge, this is the first 
test of the theory in both environments. Furthermore, the case of Brazil offers the opportunity 
of engaging in future comparative studies of budgeting in countries that also had bureaucratic 
authoritarian regimes, such as Argentina. 
The periods of analysis represent the years of authoritarian rule (1964-1985), and, in 
the democratic period, the years of center wing party rule (PSDB, 1995-2002) and the years 
of left wing party rule (Workers’ Party, or the PT, 2003-2010). I will not look at the period 
during which the country was drafting its new constitution or at the first years after 
democratization. The reasons for this are twofold. First, the forum established for the 
elaboration of the constitution (“Assembleia Constituinte”) had its own institutional rules, 
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which are beyond the scope of this paper. Also, I decided to focus on the aforementioned 
democratic periods in order to capture the possible variation caused by partisanship rule in 
the country. While the PSDB is a centrist party, the Workers’ Party is a leftist party, so if 
partisanship plays any role in spending in all policy areas, one would expect to find it within 
this period. 
This paper adopts a mix-methods approach that combines stochastic analysis of 
budget data with qualitative assessment of the independent variables. I compiled two data sets 
to measure my dependent variable (policymaking/budgeting). The first data set is comprised 
of all available authorized budget data extracted from the Brazilian Institute of Geography 
and Statistics (IBGE) from 1964 to 1985 and from 1995 to 2010. The IBGE data set is 
extracted from the Lei Orçamentária Annual (LOA), the Brazilian Budgetary Law. In Brazil, 
the LOA only authorizes the government to promote expenditures; it does not require the 
government to do so. In this paper I focus on the decision-making process of the LOA 
because it is not possible to compare budgeting under the authoritarian and democratic 
periods using budget data as it was implemented.  
The only data set that is available for both political regimes is the one presented by 
the IBGE, and it refers to the expenditures authorized by the LOA. Some budget categories 
related to general expenses were not incorporated in this analysis but will be added to the data 
set in the future. The data has been converted into present value Reais (R$) and adjusted for 
inflation, and is listed by topic codes that cover the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial 
branches and their subtopics, and general areas of spending such as education, health, or 
transportation. This data set has 162 different budget categories and should be comprised of 
6,156 observations (38 years of data times 162 categories). However, the categories are not 
the same for all years, which means I lose lots of cases. The data set is, thus, comprised of 
1,847 observations.    
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I calculate all annual percent changes in spending from year to year (spending for 
each category in year y minus spending for each category in year y-1 divided by spending for 
each category in year y-1), for each of about the 162 categories of spending present in my 
first data set. This means that I have a percent change variable for each year (authoritarian 
and democratic) indicating how much spending changed from one year to the next across 162 
spending categories. The total number of observations (N= 1,592) is smaller in the case of the 
percent change data set because if a category had a change in definition in a certain year or is 
not present in a certain year, I do not analyze that category in that certain year. After 
calculating the annual percent changes, I set up frequency distributions of budget changes for 
authoritarianism, the first period of authoritarianism, the second period of authoritarianism, 
democracy, Cardoso’s administration, and Lula’s administration.  
The punctuated equilibrium theory departs from the central limit theorem (CLT) by 
assuming that the aggregated budgetary distributions of governments that proportionally 
respond to all societal problems approach normality. While a standard measure of a 
distribution’s shape is the kurtosis (the standardized fourth population moment about the 
mean), this statistic is sensitive to outliers. For this reason, I use a measure of kurtosis based 
on L-moments, which is more robust against outliers: the l-kurtosis. This statistic assumes 
values that vary from 0 to 1, and takes the value of 0.123 for normal distributions. In other 
words, l-kurtosis values higher than 0.123 indicate the presence of leptokurtosis, which, in 
the PET theory, indicates disproportionality in governmental response. In this paper I develop 
expectations for the values of the l-kurtosis in terms of proportionality. Table 2 summarizes 
this approach.  
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Table 2 – Measurement of proportionality 
L-kurtosis value  Level of proportionality  
0.123 High 
0.123<value<0.4 Medium 
0.4<value<0.7 Low 
0.7<value<1 Very low 
 
The second data set is comprised of a sample of the first. The data is listed by policy 
issues and was developed by a recoding of the initial codes. I recoded only the Executive 
branch initial codes (which yields spending of different ministries and general expenses of 
the Executive branch) because they are consistent throughout both political regimes, although 
the names of the ministries vary within and across regimes. I solved this problem by creating 
broader policy issue codes that allowed me to code ministries with different names but that 
relate to the same issue under the same category. For instance, the Ministry of Transportation 
and Public Works (authoritarian period) and Ministry of Transportation (democratic period) 
were coded in the same policy issue (Public Works). The following policy issues are captured 
in the data set: Defense, Public Works, Education and Culture, Agriculture, Finance, Labor, 
Science and Technology, Social Affairs, Industry, Justice, Health, Energy, and 
Communications. The category of general expenses of the Executive was left out of the data 
set because it is not clearly related to any particular social or political purpose.  This data set 
allows me to assess the patterns of state spending and to plot percentage change graphs for 
different policy issues in the authoritarian and democratic periods. In this paper I do not 
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calculate expenditures as a percentage of GDP because of time constraints, but I plan to do 
this in the future using data from the Penn World Table.  
I begin the qualitative assessment of the independent variables by evaluating the level 
of institutional friction in budgeting in Brazil. In order to do so, I rely on information 
extracted from primary (legislation and legal documents) and secondary sources (previous 
works published about the topic).  In order to measure the variable “signal detection,” I use 
the Freedom House indicators of political rights and civil liberties, which are available form 
1979 to 2009 for Brazil. The indicator for political rights measures whether people have the 
right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, 
join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact 
on public policies and are accountable to the electorate. For this reason, I believe it is a proxy 
to the existence of electoral accountability. The indicator of civil liberties captures the extent 
to which civil society can emit signals to the government, since it combines measures of 
freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and 
personal autonomy and individual rights. The indicators assume values between 0 and 7, with 
0 being the highest score a country can obtain in terms of political rights or civil liberties, and 
7 as the lowest. My measure of signal detection is an adapted version of the rating adopted by 
Freedom House. I calculate the average scores of civil liberties and political rights for each 
period analyzed in this paper (except the first period of authoritarianism, since there is no 
data available for 1964-1974). I assign the level “very low” to scores that vary between 6 and 
7; “low to medium” to scores that vary between 3 and 5; and “medium to high” to scores that 
vary between 1 and 2.  
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Table 3 – Measurement of the variable “signal detection” 
Freedom House Indicators Score Level of signal detection  
6<value<7 Very low 
3<value<5 Low to Medium 
2<value<1  Medium to High 
 
I also use secondary sources to measure the variables multiplicity of goals and level of 
threshold. I collect information from the literature about the Brazilian economy and the 
Brazilian political history. I assess the variable “cognitive overload” by presenting 
information extracted from the literature about the topic (Jones 1999; Baumgartner and Jones 
2005; Weyland 2008), but, as I note in the last section of this thesis, I plan to measure this 
variable through interviews in the future. Finally, I complement the analysis presented in this 
paper with a short assessment of which policy areas drive strong commitment to the status 
quo or policy punctuations by plotting graphs of percentage change for different issues. 
Although this thesis does not delve into policy processes with great depth, I briefly analyze 
social assistance policies in the next section and energy policy in the fourth section.   
 
 
PUBLIC SPENDING: AUTOCRACY VS. DEMOCRACY 
There is a wide-ranging6 body of work in social sciences that explores the effects of 
democracy in social spending. Some scholars argue that democracies have important effects 
on human development across the globe (Lake and Baum 2001; Boix 2001; Brown and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For an extensive review about these works see Gerring et al. (2012) 
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Hunter 2004), while others still question the existence or the robustness of such correlations 
(Gauri and Khaleghian; Shandra et al. 2004). A part of this literature also asserts that the 
relationship between democracy and human development is strong in OECD countries, but 
not so much in non-OECD countries (Filmer and Pritchett 1999; McGuire 2004; Keefer 
2006). Recently, Gerring et al. (2012) proposed that it is the stock of democracy, and not the 
level of democracy, that affects a country’s level of development. This argument dialogues 
with the also recent work of Huber and Stephens (2012), who maintain that the stock of 
democracy, through the rise of left parties, impacts the allocation of social spending on 
poverty and inequality in Latin American countries.  
This thesis finds evidence that supports the views according to which the stock of 
democracy and the rise of leftist parties have substantial effects on social spending. In the 
figures below, the category “social affairs” is comprised of spending with social security, 
hunger alleviation, and social assistance. Health and education figure as separate categories 
of spending, and the category “education and culture” is comprised of spending with 
education, culture, and sports. Finally, the category “public works” is comprised of spending 
with transportation and infrastructure in general. It is important to note that, for now, the data 
presented in this section is total spending and not expenditures as a percentage of GDP, 
which would be the ideal indicator. For this reason, it is possible to find discrepancies 
between this paper and other works that analyze social spending in Brazil. For instance, while 
my thesis indicates that the Lula government, when compared to the Cardoso administration, 
increased spending in education and culture, Huber and Stephens (2012) argue that 
expenditures as a percentage of GDP under Lula remained at the levels reached under 
Cardoso. Figure 3 plots spending in all policy areas during the bureaucratic authoritarian 
period. Although education and culture emerges as one of the priorities of autocrats (in 
particular in the second period of bureaucratic authoritarianism), the level of spending with 
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health and social spending remains low throughout the entire period. The figure indicates 
three other policy priorities for autocrats: public works, defense, and agriculture.   
 
Figure 2 – Total spending in all policy areas – Authoritarianism and Democracy 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – Total spending in all policy areas – Authoritarianism (1964-1985) 
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Figure 4 – Total spending in Education and Culture and Health  
 
  
Figure 2 plots spending in all policy areas in both political regimes. Spending on 
social affairs increased substantially after 19957. The same pattern is observed in spending 
with health and education and culture, as revealed by Figure 4, although I find decline in 
spending in both areas from 1997 to 1999, when the country faced the Asian economic crisis 
and the Brazilian monetary crisis. The increase in spending in social affairs, health, and 
education and culture is even more substantial after 2003, the year in which President Lula, 
from the Worker’s Party, took office. One of the two major goals of President Lula was to 
achieve a greater degree of socioeconomic equality (Baer 2014). In terms of social assistance, 
the Lula administration established the Bolsa Família, a program that combines previously 
existing policies, such as President Cardoso’s Bolsa Escola, and provides a cash payment to 
poor families on the condition that they send their children to school and that children under 
the age of 7 participate in health checkups. While the Bolsa Escola had reached 5.1 million 
families in its peak, the Bolsa Família reached 12.4 million families in 2009 (Huber and 
Stephens 2012). Another policy innovation of the Lula administration was the expansion of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Spending with Social Security and Pension reached 2013 value R$ 249,7 billion; all other expenditures in the 
graph relate to social assistance and poverty alleviation programs, culture, and sports.  
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the minimum wage, which increased from present value R$ 200 in 2002 to R$ 510 in 20098. 
Thus, as anticipated by Huber and Stephens (2012), center parties play important roles in the 
enactment of social policies in Latin American, but leftist parties shifted the structure of 
spending to make it more redistributive (Huber and Stephens 2012: 151). 
The purpose of this section is to specify that this paper conforms to the mainstream 
works that explore the relationship between democracy and social spending. The data 
presented here indicates that, in the context of social spending, democracy and especially the 
rise of left parties are key drivers of policy processes in Latin America. Spending in social 
affairs and health were not priorities of the bureaucratic authoritarian government, and as 
Brown and Hunter (2004) suggest, education is often a priority of autocrats because (1) 
human capital is critical to economic development, (2) investment in basic schooling helps 
autocrats to gain legitimacy with the popular sectors, and (3) investment in higher education 
helps autocrats to maintain middle-class support and stability. As I argue in the next section, 
economic growth and development and the control of social unrest and subversion were top 
priorities of the Brazilian bureaucratic authoritarian regime.  
The questions of interest to this paper, however, are (1) the degree to which the 
government responds proportionally to societal problems in general through public budgeting 
and (2) the resulting patterns of stability and policy punctuations in autocracies and 
democracies. I turn to this analysis in the next section. 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Ministério do Trabalho e Emprego.  
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PROPORTIONALITY AND THE PTE: AUTOCRACY VS. DEMOCRACY 
The case I analyze in this paper is the one of Brazil. I argue that institutional friction 
does not severely constrain decision-makers in Brazil because executives retain power in 
decision-making of the public budget in both political regimes. In the bureaucratic 
authoritarian period, the military government used constitutional amendments, institutional 
acts, and executive decrees to reduce in great depth the roles of the legislatures and the 
judiciary (Skidmore 1988). The Institutional Act No 1, issued by General Arthur da Costa e 
Silva in 1964 before the nomination of General Humberto de Castello Branco as the first 
military president, established that the president would have exclusive power to propose 
expenditure bills to Congress, which could not increase any spending item (Skidmore 1988). 
Afterward, the Constitution of 1967 deliberately isolated legislators from decision-making in 
terms of budgeting. Rocha (2008) notes that the executive employed such restrictions for 
congressional involvement because it prioritized rationality over participation. At the same 
time, the bureaucratic authoritarian government conceded broader decision-making capacity 
to technocrats in budgeting and in the management of public policies. This pattern would be 
maintained until the end of the military regime.  
The Constitution of 1988 maintained strong presidential powers for Brazilian 
presidents that were inherited from the military regime (Alston et al. 2006). The literature that 
explores the strong institutional powers of presidents in Brazil is extensive (see Limongi 
2006; Figueiredo and Limongi 1995, 1997, 1999, 2007; Pereira and Mueller 2000; 
Meneguello 1998). Limongi (2006) finds that 70.7% of the legislative proposals introduced 
by Brazilian presidents are approved during their mandates (“rate of success”). The rate of 
dominance, that is, the number of bills proposed by the Executive as a proportion of the total 
number of approved laws, is 85.6%. Alston et al. (2006) argue that, except in a few high-
profile cases, such as pension reform during the Cardoso administration and tax reform 
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during the Lula presidency, the Brazilian president “has generally gotten what he wanted”, 
with gridlock and similar outcomes being exceptional (Alston et al. 2006: 10). Furthermore, 
while the authors recognize the existence of democratic checks and balances, they argue that 
the separation of powers is clearly biased towards the president.  
Brazilian presidents enjoy several prerogatives in policymaking, including the 
exclusive right to initiate new legislation in budget. Every year, the budgetary law – Lei 
Orçamentária Anual (LOA) – is drafted by the executive and referred to the congressional 
Budget Committee to be approved by legislators. Although the congressional majority has the 
right to amend the bill, it is the executive who determines which amendments are 
appropriated since they have to be compatible with both a multi-year budget plan elaborated 
on by the executive as well as with a law on budgetary guidelines (Alston et al. 2006: 19-20). 
In other words, legislators do not have the power to authorize expenditures; they can only 
reallocate public investment after the executive has defined the priority areas. Rocha (2008) 
argues that even their reallocation power is restricted, and it was remarkably so during the 
periods of economic crises that took place during the 1990s.  
In practice, the executive exerts a strict control of the budgetary agenda by defining 
the issues to be discussed and by determining the procedures to be followed in decision-
making (Rocha 2008). Examples of the legal procedures that guarantee such control are the 
following: the executive holds the prerogative to send “modification amendments” to the 
Budget Committee, which has been used to inhibit congressional action on budgetary matters, 
and the regra of duodécimo, established by Congress in 1990, which allows the executive to 
implement its version of the LOA if Congress has not voted on it within the required time. In 
regard to the creation of the “regra of duodecimo,” Rocha (2008) raises the possibility that 
the intention of legislators was to avoid a possible gridlock in budgeting that would deflagrate 
an institutional crisis similar to the one that took place in 1964. In any case, the author 
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contends that the executive has maintained a strong prominence in the budgeting processes 
since the establishment of the Constitution in 1988. 
 Figures 5 and 6 diagram the budget frequency distribution for the bureaucratic 
authoritarian and democratic periods; each figure contains a hypothetical normal distribution. 
Both have l-kurtosis values bigger than 0.123, fat tails, and slender central peaks, which 
indicate leptokurtosis. The level of proportionality is low in both cases, but it is surprisingly 
lower in the case of democracy (the l-kurtosis is 0.768). The best approach to grapple with 
such result is to decompose these budget frequency distributions into four new distributions, 
which are presented in Figures 7-10. As predicted, the level of proportionality in the first 
period of bureaucratic authoritarianism is higher than in the second (the l-kurtosis for the first 
period is 0.324 and for the second period is 0.486). In the case of the second period of 
authoritarianism, the distribution is skewed toward the positive side, which indicates that 
policymakers promoted more investments than cuts, despite the presence of severe economic 
crises, as I argue below. The budget frequency distribution for the first period seems balanced 
in terms of investments and cuts, since it is not clearly skewed toward the positive or the 
negative side.  
Figure 5 – Budget Change Frequency Distribution – Authoritarianism (1964-1985) 
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Figure 6 – Budget Change Frequency Distribution – Democracy (1995-2010) 
 
 
Figure 9 explains why the level of proportionality in the democratic period is lower 
than under bureaucratic authoritarianism. In the case of the Cardoso administration (1995-
2002), the l-kurtosis is 0.851, which indicates very low proportionality in governmental 
response. The figure also indicates that policymakers conducted frequent cuts in the range of 
5 to 20 percent, and investments were less frequent. Figure 9, on the contrary, indicates a 
medium level of proportionality during the Lula presidency (2003-2010), since the l-kurtosis 
is 0.378. Also, policymakers promoted more policy innovations than cuts. Finally, as 
predicted, the level of proportionality is medium in the first stage of the bureaucratic 
authoritarian regime and in the Lula administration, periods that are supposedly favorable for 
proportional governmental response. This indicates that bounded rationality is indeed a 
constraint in policymaking (Jones 1999; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Weyland 2008). I 
explore this issue in the below paragraphs.  
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Figure 7 – Budget Change Frequency Distribution – Authoritarianism 1 (1964-1974) 
 
 
Figure 8 – Budget Change Frequency Distribution – Authoritarianism 2 (1975-1985) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  47	  
	  
Figure 9 – Budget Change Frequency Distribution – Cardoso (1995-2002) 
 
 
Figure 10 – Budget Change Frequency Distribution – Lula (2003-2010) 
 
 
As Figure 1 indicates, the first step to interpret the above results is to assess how the 
characteristics of political regimes affect signal detection. Figures 11 and 12 plot the average 
Freedom House scores for each period of government and the corresponding L-Kurtosis 
values. I assume that the average of both indicators reach 6 or 7 in the first period of 
authoritarianism since it was the most authoritarian. The Brazilian bureaucratic authoritarian 
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government was a compromise between two groups of rulers: the hard-liners (mostly military 
officers) and the moderates (military officers and civilians). The hard-liners adopted extreme 
authoritarianism, while the moderates aimed to eventually re-establish democracy. Although 
President Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco (1964-1966) was from the moderate group, 
his administration started under the shadow of the Institutional Act No. 1, which gave him 
arbitrary powers for 90 days; purged the Congress and the civil service; removed several 
governors; and forced the military officer corps that supported overthrown president Goulart 
to retire (Skidmore 1973). In 1969, the military established the Institutional Act No. 5, which 
allowed the non-elected president to order the Congress into forced recess, to promote 
censorship of different types of media, and to determine the illegality of all political meetings 
that were not authorized by the police, among other measures. Having lost control of the 
presidency in 1967, the moderate military group would only take office again in 1974, when 
President Ernesto Geisel took office.  
 
Figure 11 – Political Rights Score and L-Kurtosis  
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Figure 12 – Civil Liberties Score and L-Kurtosis  
 
 
Assuming that the level of signal detection was very low during the first period of 
authoritarianism, Figures 11 and 12 indicate that the level of signal detection within the 
second period of bureaucratic authoritarianism varied from low to medium. In the case of 
democracy, the level of signal detection during the Cardoso administration varied from low to 
medium, and during the Lula administration varied from medium to high. Figure 12 indicates 
that the average civil liberties score of the Cardoso administration (3.75) was lower and very 
similar to average score of the second period of bureaucratic authoritarianism (3.85). This 
indicates that from 1995 to 2002 the country only moderately protected all civil liberties or 
protected some civil liberties while less strongly protecting others. Since detailed reports 
about Brazil are only available from 2002 onward, it is not possible to explore the civil 
liberties indicator with greater depth.  Further research needs to be conducted in order to 
develop a better understanding of how civil liberties were being inhibited.  
During the first period of the bureaucratic authoritarian regime, the economic crisis 
was of low to medium severity. Although the annual inflation rate started at 100 percent in 
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1964, it dropped to 25 percent in 1967 and to 15.7 percent in 19739. The overall GDP growth 
rate was 2.9 percent in 1964, but reached 11 percent in 1968 and 9.5 percent in 1974 
(Skidmore 1988). At the moment, economic growth, the consensus goal of the upper classes 
that formed the ruling coalition, was secured through the “economic miracle.” Not only the 
ruling coalition was united with the military rulers:  from 1967 to 1974 there was a united 
military leadership with a clear vision, as both Presidents Costa e Silva and Médici 
represented the group of hard-liners. In this context, we can expect to see low multiplicity of 
goals, as indicated by Table 4: technocratic policymakers were concerned with rational 
decision-making, the maintenance of economic growth and stability, the adoption of policies 
that would foster capital accumulation, and the control of subversion. Following the logic of 
O’Donnell’s (1973) argument, the range of problems with which policymakers were 
concerned was small because wealth redistribution and other social goals could only be 
achieved after the stabilization of the economy.  
During the second period of the bureaucratic authoritarian regime, signal detection 
varied from low to medium. To begin with, it was during this stage that the divergences 
between the hard-liners and the moderates became more evident. This is what leads Stepan 
(1988: 27) to indicate the existence of “a state within the state.” There was a clear intent to 
initiate the liberalization process from the military rulers, but the repressive apparatus led by 
the hard-liners was autonomous and still relying on torture and disappearance to stop social 
conflicts (Stepan 1988).  The economic crisis was of high severity during this period, 
especially after the OPEC oil shock in late 1973. The Ernesto Geisel presidency maintained 
economic growth by rapidly increasing its borrowing abroad – in 1974, the external debt 
jumped from $6.2 billion to $11.9 billion (Skidmore 1988). Given the option of the Geisel 
administration to sustain economic growth despite unfavorable circumstances, the average 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Skidmore (1988) notes that the inflation data for the year of 1973 is not reliable because the military 
government manipulated the index through political interference in data compilation.  
	  51	  
	  
annual GDP growth rate between 1974 and 1978 was 7 percent, although in 1977 it declined 
to 5.4 percent and in 1978 decreased to 4.8 percent. In 1975, policymakers enacted the 
Second National Development Plan (PND II, 1975-1979), which was a huge investment 
program aimed at the rapid expansion of the economic infrastructure, authorizing investments 
in energy policy, transportation, and communication (Baer 2014).  
Meanwhile, the annual rate of inflation did not stop growing. In 1974, it reached 34.5 
percent. From 1979 to 1984, the increase in the index was constant: from 77 percent in 1979, 
to 99.7 percent in 1981, to 223.8 percent in 1983 and 222 percent in 1984 (Skidmore 1988). 
The most clear evidence that the Brazilian military regime had decided to focus on economic 
growth at all costs despite the severity of the economic crisis was the resignation of Planning 
Minister Mario Simonsen, who in 1979 attempted to warn the government that they had to 
throttle down the economy because of the increasing balance of payments pressure and the 
rise in the inflation rate. His message was poorly received not only by the military 
government and their technocrats, but also by the business community. Simonsen received 
support only from the MDB, the opposition party. With his resignation in late 1979 and the 
choice of Delfim Netto as the new Planning Minister, the priority for economic growth 
remained unquestioned.  
By 1982, all the Brazilian economic policymakers were discredited in the eyes of the 
public (Skidmore 1988). Nevertheless, the III National Development Plan (PND III, 1980-
1986) reaffirmed the goal of maintaining economic growth by the investment in agriculture, 
energy, and social needs (education, health, and housing). Although both Presidents Geisel 
and Figueiredo considered social policy a priority, Germano (1990) identifies that the small 
investments in partnerships with subnational governments and community organizations 
provided only precarious education opportunities for the poorest populations.  
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When the government finally recognized the signals of an economic crisis, President 
Figueiredo attempted to avoid an agreement with the IMF by carrying out austerity programs 
developed by the government. In November 1982 it finally turned to the IMF, although Baer 
(2014) contends that the Brazilian military government did not find its relations with the 
organization easy.  That happened because the policies that were adopted did not result in the 
attainment of targets set with the IMF (Baer 2014: 84-85). Besides the goal of sustaining 
economic growth, policymakers in the second period of bureaucratic authoritarianism also 
wanted to improve income distribution, control subversion and social unrest, and start the 
process of political liberalization. Their set of goals was, thus, of low to medium level in 
terms of multiplicity.   
From 1995, when President Fernando Henrique Cardoso took office (from the centrist 
party PSDB), to 1997, the threat of hyperinflation that was present in the country from mid-
1980s and most of the 1990s was gone. However, the world financial crisis that started in 
Asia in July 1997 hit Russia strongly in 1998 and then hit Brazil. Cardoso’s policymakers 
were thus forced to raise interest rates and increase taxes to save the strength of the Real 
(Skidmore et al. 2010).  
After his reelection in 1998, President Cardoso was pressured by the IMF to make 
broad cuts in public spending and to raise taxes and interest rates once again. In order to 
support the Real, the Brazilian government signed an agreement in November 2008 with the 
IMF, the World Bank, and the U.S. government that provided the country with US$ 41.5 
billion. According to Baer (2014), by mid-December 1998, the Congress had already 
approved almost 60 percent of the fiscal adjustment demanded under the terms of the 
program. Skidmore et al. note, “Cardoso and his finance minister, Pedro Malan, gained a 
reputation for following to the letter the demands of their foreign creditors, especially the 
IMF” (2010: 344). In 1999, the Cardoso administration faced new pressures with the maxi-
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devaluation of the Real, which led policymakers to promote primary budget surpluses in 
order to receive loans from the IMF (Baer 2014).  
Nevertheless, Cardoso still promoted a moderate push to strengthen elementary 
education and attempted to conduct pension and tax reforms. He also enacted policies in 
social assistance, such as the Bolsa Escola and the Comunidade Solidária, but the reach of 
these policies was not substantial10. Because of the centrist ideology of president’s party, the 
strong weight given to the economic priorities and the modest investment in social issues, I 
classify the level of multiplicity of the Cardoso administration as medium.  
The economic crises were gone by the time President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, from 
the Worker’s Party, took office in 2003, but he suffered substantial pressure from 
international financial circles to maintain the orthodox macroeconomic policies of the 
Cardoso administration – which he did. The Lula administration achieved satisfactory budget 
surplus in its first two years as required by the IMF, and paid off its debt in full with the 
organization by 2005, two years ahead of schedule (Skidmore et al. 2010). The commodities 
boom in the 2000s strengthened the economy (Skidmore et al. 2010) and reduced economic 
constraints on policymaking (Huber and Stephens 2012). As noted in the previous section, 
President Lula invested substantially in social policy and approved a reform of the social 
security system, attempted to promote tax reform, and enacted education policies that aimed 
to increase quality in schooling (Love and Baer 2009). Therefore, the level of multiplicity of 
goals was high, since the partisan ideology was leftist, there were no economic crises, and, 
despite the strong weight put on social policy, the Lula administration had several other goals 
in terms of governing. Table 4 summarizes the different goals of the bureaucratic 
authoritarian and democratic governments.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 As argued by Huber and Stephens (2012). Also, the program “Comunidade Solidária” is discussed in the 
report Fome Zero: Uma História Brasileira, accessed in April 2014 
(http://www.mds.gov.br/saladeimprensa/noticias/2011/agosto/Fome%20Zero%20Vol1.pdf) 
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Table 4 – Multiplicity of goals of authoritarian and democratic governments  
Form of 
government 
Governmental goals Level of 
multiplicity 
Authoritarian 1 
(1964-1974) 
• Rationality 
• Economic growth and stability 
• Support the private sector 
• Control subversives and social unrest 
Low 
Authoritarian 2 
(1975-1985) 
• Economic growth and stability 
• Improvement of income distribution 
• Control subversives and social unrest 
• Liberalization 
 
Low to Medium  
Democracy/ 
Cardoso 
(1995-2002) 
• Economic growth and stability 
• Austerity 
• Balanced budgets 
• Privatization 
• Investment in education 
• Pension and tax reforms 
 
Medium  
Democracy/ 
Lula  
• Economic growth and stability 
• Redistribution 
High 
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(2003-2010) • Poverty alleviation 
• Tax reform 
• Social security reform  
• Investment in research and education  
 
Sources: O’Donnell (1973); Collier (1979); Skidmore (1988); Stepan (1988); Coes (1995); 
Love and Baer (2009); Baer (2014).  
 
In this paper I argue that the interaction between the level of multiplicity of goals, the 
level of threshold that triggers government action, and the limited attention to which 
policymakers are subjected to explain the different levels of proportionality in governmental 
response. Scholarship on bounded rationality (Jones 1999, 2001; Baumgartner and Jones 
2005; Weyland 2008) indicates that decision-makers are goal-oriented and strategic, as 
predicted by the rational choice theory, but they make systematic and repetitive mistakes. 
These errors involve limited attention, bias in the use of information, simplification and 
distortion in comprehending information, and cognitive and emotional identification with 
particular ways of solving problems (Jones and Baumgartner 2005: 16). Weyland (2008) 
tested the bounded rationality assumptions in his study about social policy diffusion in Latin 
America. Using interviews with decision-makers as one of his sources of research, the author 
finds that rather than scanning the international environment broadly and proactively, they 
“have focused on information that happened to become available, often for logically 
accidental reasons” (Weyland 2008: 218).  
From the bounded rationality theory, Jones and Baumgartner (2005) identify the four 
mechanisms that explain the mismatch between problem severity and policy outputs: (1) 
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attention allocation, (2) the utility of any public action in some areas, (3) the explicit 
calculation that the problem is not worth the effort given other competing claims, (4) and the 
ideology of policymakers. In this thesis, factors (3) and (4) affect the formation of 
governmental goals of all four periods of government, but I suggest that they also affect 
decision-making after the definition of governmental goals in the case of the second period of 
bureaucratic authoritarianism and the Cardoso presidency. In those periods, policymakers 
were unwilling to consider external information because of the weight put on other priorities. 
Furthermore, I suggest that although attention allocation affects all four periods of 
government, its effects are particularly evident in the case of the first period of bureaucratic 
authoritarianism and the Lula presidency. Regardless of which aspect of bounded rationality 
affects decision-making, the result is that it generates disproportionate information-
processing and governmental response because “signals are ignored, responses are delayed, 
and ineffective strategies are deployed” (Jones and Baumgartner 2005: 17). In other words, 
for different reasons, problems are unaddressed in autocracies and democracies, and they 
cannot be ignored indefinitely.  
Figures 13-16 diagram the percentage change in budget in different policy areas 
during bureaucratic authoritarian and democratic periods. It is important to make three notes 
about these figures. First, all percent changes greater than negative or positive 50 percent 
were clumped within the -50/50 range. Second, the figures were plotted with the second data 
set, which is a sample of the 167 initial budgetary categories. For this reason, the recurrent 
budget cuts observed during the Cardoso administration do not manifest with the same 
frequency in these figures.  
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Figure 13 – Percentage change in Education and Culture, Health, and Social Affairs – 
Authoritarianism and Democracy  
 
 
Figure 14 – Percentage change in Industry, Energy and Public Works – Authoritarianism and 
Democracy  
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Figure 15 – Percentage change in Agriculture, Labor, and Justice – Authoritarianism and 
Democracy  
 
 
Figure 16 – Percentage Change in Communications, Defense, and Finance – 
Authoritarianism and Democracy  
 
 
Nevertheless, I find budget cuts in all policy areas in the period of 1997-1999; these 
cuts are more frequently in the range of 10-20 percent than in the 40-50 percent range. The 
figures confirm the qualitative assessment presented in the above paragraphs with relation to 
	  59	  
	  
the bureaucratic authoritarian government. In the second period of authoritarianism, I find 
more budget increases than decreases in the areas of education and culture, agriculture, 
health, and industry. Another interesting finding in terms of percentage change is the relative 
stability of health, education and culture, and social affairs during the democratic period. This 
contrasts with several policy changes in areas such as industry, communications, and 
agriculture.  
Another interesting punctuation pattern is the one found in Figure 14, which diagrams 
percentage change in energy policy. It is possible to observe high increases of 30 and then 50 
percentage in the period of 2000-2003. This punctuation is noteworthy because the country 
experienced a severe energy blackout that started in June 2001 and lasted until February 
2002. The blackout involved frequent interruptions in energy distribution and resulted from a 
mismatch between supply and demand. Bardelin (2004) argues that two factors caused the 
blackout:  the increase in energy consumption beginning in the 1980s was not followed by an 
increase in investment, and a severe drought occurred in 2001 in the country. The author 
indicates that governmental reports from 1999 already predicted the risk of energy shortage, 
but that the Cardoso administration would only recognize the problem in March 2001 and 
would only admit the need for interruption in energy distribution in May 2001. Still in May, 
President Cardoso established the Chamber for the Energy Crisis (GCE) within the 
presidential bureaucracy. In order to manage the energy supply crisis, the GCE gained strong 
institutional powers to make immediate decisions that did not require approval from Congress 
or the president (Bardelin 2004).  
It is necessary to conduct further research about energy policy in order to develop a 
better understanding of the energy blackout and the policies that were adopted after it. 
Mueller and Oliveira (2009) argue that the regulatory changes of 1995 were also responsible 
for the blackout of 2001, and that prompted by the problems in the sector, President Lula 
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determined that studies should be undertaken to revamp the electricity sector’s regulatory 
framework. After the creation of the Energy Research Company (Empresa de Pesquisa 
Energética), the Lula administration introduced changes in the regulatory model that had 
been established by Cardoso – according to Mueller and Oliveira, the model has also 
produced mixed results. The case of energy policy indicates the need for policymaking 
scholarship in Latin America to look beyond the adoptions of social policies in order to 
investigate the extent to which party platforms influence different policy issues. The study of 
the relative efficiency in budgetary allocation and the resulting patterns of policy behavior 
allowed me to briefly assess the role of information in policymaking in Brazil. The policy 
changes indicated in Figure 14 are not linked to party platforms, but to external information. 
In particular, the case of energy policy indicates that policymakers can indeed ignore signals, 
but that delays are necessarily followed by overreaction (Jones and Baumgartner 2005).   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis evaluates the impact of authoritarian and democratic regimes on 
policymaking – in particular, public budgeting – in Brazil. The test of the punctuated 
equilibrium theory in the context of authoritarianism and democratic regimes in Latin 
America has allowed me to reach two conclusions. First, scholarship should not overestimate 
the effect of regime type in policymaking processes.  Proportionality in governmental 
response can be lower in democracies than in autocracies if economic constraints are severe 
and the ideology of decision-makers is centrist. This combination results in narrower sets of 
goals, which when combined with the cognitive limitations of policymakers and low levels of 
the threshold that triggers governmental action, produce disproportionate information 
processing. Second, even under the best conditions in authoritarian or democratic regimes 
that would favor proportionality, the connection between the size of changes in governmental 
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response to the size of incoming signals from the environment can be at best medium because 
of bounded rationality (in particular attention limitation).  
The findings presented in this paper are preliminary and invite further research. In 
particular, it is possible that institutional friction affects policymaking processes that go 
beyond public budgeting. Furthermore, policy changes conducted on public budgeting are not 
necessarily keyed to statutory changes. I intend to collect data about congressional hearings 
and bills and executive orders to analyze the degree to which veto points provoke political 
gridlock and block policy change.  
The second limitation of my work is the fact that it would be necessary to conduct 
interviews with decision-makers to assess whether and/or how cognitive limitations indeed 
constrain policymaking. While this is possible in the case of democracy, the feasibility of this 
strategy during the authoritarian period is not guaranteed. My first step in this sense would be 
to consult primary sources about the military regime in Brazil in order to better understand 
the nature of decision-making at that period.  
Third, it would be necessary to collect data on policy outputs in order to measure the 
extent to which problems are indeed severe as I claim. For example, in the case of energy 
policy, the ideal research would present data on lack of investment, increase in consumption 
and so forth. This data could then be used in a comparison between the proportionality of 
governmental response and the severity of the incoming signals that come from the 
environment.  
Also, an ideal research design would explore other bureaucratic authoritarian 
governments, other authoritarian regimes, and democratic countries in which the president 
does not hold strong institutional powers. It is not clear to me what would be the best strategy 
in terms of expanding my research to other countries in a potential dissertation project. 
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Finally, I plan to conduct two immediate corrections to this thesis in the near future: I will 
add more budget categories in my data set and I will convert the spending data to spending as 
a percent of GDP.  
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